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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses factors that affect bank capital. We use a sample of U.S. banks over the period 
1996 to 2012. According to bank size, we separate the whole sample into small banks, medium 
banks and large banks. These three groups have different abilities to manage risks and access 
capital markets. To see the impact of the recent financial crisis, we further separate the whole 
sample into two subsamples: 1996 to 2006 and 2007 to 2012. Making use of an advanced 
estimation method (GMM), we find that bank capital is influenced by risk, profitability, deposits, 
loan loss provision, and size. 
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Introduction  
 
A bank’s capital structure influences its ability to offer liquidity and credits (Diamond and 
Rajan , 2000 ). As a healthy banking system plays crucial role in the rapid growth of economy, 
it is significant to understand factors driving banks capital. 
 
According to buffer theory, a certain buffer of regulatory capital greater than the regulatory 
minimum (8% of risk-weighted assets) should be maintained by banks. Regulations impact 
bank capital a lot, because regulators believe that capital is essential to ensure bank safety. In 
this paper, we try to find some other factors that also affect bank capital. In particular, we 
examine the impact of risk, profitability, deposits, loan loss provision, and size. 
 
Because banks of different size have different abilities to manage risks and access capital 
markets, we divide banks in our sample into three groups. The first group is small banks, with 
each having total assets of less than 1 billon. The second group is medium banks, with each 
having total assets between 1 billion and 3 billion. The third group is large banks, with each 
having total assets of more than 3 billion. Although all the U.S. banks are supervised by the 
same agency and subject to the same capital requirements, banks of different size may have 
different determinants of capital. 
 
The recent financial crisis significantly affected bank performance. Bank credit to private 
sector and asset growing rate declined dramatically. Making the year of 2007 the cut-off point, 
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we divide the whole sample into two subsamples: 1996-2006 and 2007-2012. We do so to 
examine whether the recent financial crisis has changed the determinants of bank capital. 
 
Because we include an explanatory variable “lagged capital” to see the relationship between 
capital of current year with that of previous year, we use the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) to estimate the results. This method allows us to control for the endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables and improve the accuracy of our regression results. 
 
We find that bank capital of the current year is positively related with that of the previous year. 
This result is consistent with findings in Kleff and Weber (2008), which use a sample of 
German banks. We also find that higher profitability is associated with higher capital. On the 
other hand, the effect of deposits, loan loss provision, and size on bank capital is dependent 
on bank size and sample period. 
 
Risk is an important factor that we examine. Theory has different predictions with regard to 
the relationship between bank capital and risk. For example, Furlong and Keeley (1989) 
predict that the well-capitalized banks are less willing to increase risk. However, Kahane, 
Koehn and Santomero (1980) predict the opposite opinion. We find that the relationship is 
dependent on bank size. For small banks, risk is negatively related to capital. For large banks, 
risk is positively related to capital. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is literature review. Section 3 includes 
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hypotheses we test. Section 4 introduces the dataset. Section 5 is the detailed descriptions of 
our regression model. Section 6 reports the results. We conclude in Section 7. 
 
Literature Review 
 
There have been several capital structure theories so far. First of all, agency theory (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) links capital structure choice to agency costs, which are the cost due to 
the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers. Moreover, the pecking-order 
theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984) proposes that the degree of information 
asymmetry between firm insiders and outside investors influences capital structure choice. 
Additionally, it is stated in the static trade-off theory (Myers, 1984) that each firm has an 
optimal debt ratio, and moves to it over time. 
 
The regulation makes commercial banks different from non financial firms. Marques and 
Santos (2003) point out that capital regulation is the most important external determinant of 
bank capital structure. There are opposite views between the regulators and the bankers. For 
regulators, safety is of the first consideration, banks need to hold more capital to make the 
financial markets stable. Higher levels of capital can not only increase bank liquidity, but also 
reduce the likelihood of failure. For banks, they prefer to hold less capital to increase the 
profits. The more debt a bank uses, the greater the leverage. High leverage coverts a normal 
return on assets into a high return on equity (Koch, 2004). 
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Alfon et al (2004) shows that the possible determinants of bank capital can be grouped into 
three categories: banks’ internal considerations, market discipline and the regulatory 
framework. These three groups correspond to the three parties involved in determining banks’ 
capital structure: the bank, the market and the regulator. Knapp, Gart and Chaudhry (2006) 
find that bank profitability exhibits mean reversion. They show that after adjusting for mean 
reversion, the post-merger results in the banking industry significantly exceed those in the 
other industries. 
 
Kleff and Weber (2008) use a sample of German banks, and find four major factors that 
influence bank capital. The first factor is profitability, which is measured using the return on 
assets. The second factor is bank deposits from non-bank customers. Gupta and Walker (1975) 
point out that the more bank deposits from non-bank customers, the more positive earnings 
expectations in the future years. The third factor is loan loss provision. They use provision 
over total assets as a measure of the target capital ratio, because this ratio measures the 
financial health of a bank. Shrieves and Dahl (2003) put up a new idea that the good earning 
management may reduce the relationship between provision and capital. The fourth factor is 
regulatory pressure. Banks have an incentive to increase capital when the regulatory capital 
ratio is close to the regulatory minimum.  
 
Lin (2002) studies the relationship between bank capital and cost efficiency. Theory suggests 
that banks with lower capital have a stronger incentive to improve cost efficiency. However, 
Lin (2002) empirically finds that empirically banks with lower capital don’t improve cost 
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efficiency. 
 
Brown (2008) studies determinants of bank capital structure in developing countries, and 
finds that size, profitability, and market-to-book ratio are important determinants of bank 
capital. Specifically, leverage has a positive relationship with size and market-to-book ratio, 
and a negative relationship with profitability and tangibility in developing countries. 
 
Lee and Hsief (2013) study the relationship between a bank’s risk and capital using the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) technique. This technique resolves the possible 
simultaneity between the degree of capital and profitability, and takes the causal effect of the 
exogenous component into consideration. 
 
Helberg and Lindset (2013) point out that the difference between required capital and optimal 
capital incurs cost to shareholders, and at the same time gives banks the incentive of 
regulatory arbitrage. As a result, the reliability of the regulations is reduced, which 
undermines the effectiveness of formal capital requirements to be an important policy tool. 
Higher minimum capital requirements force banks to increase capital. Meanwhile, debt 
regulations, such as depositor preference, also encourage banks to increase capital. 
 
Wong, Choi and Fong (2005) find that there are three strategic reasons for banks to hold more 
capital. The first is financing growth, the second is adjusting cost, and the third is for the 
downward rigidity of capital. 
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Theories have identified a few subtle effects of bank capital. Myers and Rajan (1998) propose 
that the optimal leverage of a financial firm is based on the liquidity of assets. Diamond and 
Rajan (2000) propose that the trade-off between liquidity creation, costs of bank distress, and 
the ability to force borrower repayment leads to an optimal bank capital structure. Allen et al. 
(2007) propose that a bank’s capital affects its incentive to monitor borrowers. 
 
Koehn and Santomero (1980), Kim and Santomero (1988) and Rochet (1992) argue that, 
because capital is relatively expensive, the forced reduction in leverage lowers banks’ 
expected returns. As a consequence, bank owners will choose high risk in order to increase 
returns. They conclude that higher capital requirements can be associated with higher risk. 
 
Hypotheses   
 
Before we carry out empirical analysis, we state several hypotheses according to our 
knowledge. 
 
Hypothesis 1：Capital ratio is positively correlated with the lagged capital ratio. 
 
We assume that a bank incurs an adjustment cost when it changes its capital ratio rapidly. 
Thus, the bank changes its capital ratio gradually over time (Kleff and Weber, 2008). This 
implies that the capital ratio in the current period is positively associated with the lagged 
capital ratio. 
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Hypothesis 2: Capital ratio is positively correlated with profitability. 
 
When a bank has higher profits in a given year, it is able to increase its capital ratio through 
retained earnings. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Capital ratio is positively correlated with bank deposit ratio (BDR). 
 
We defined bank deposit ratio as total deposits divided by total assets. Bank deposit from 
non-bank customers is a good sign to show the reliability of a bank. We expect that banks 
with higher BDR are able to raise capital more easily. In other word, banks that already have 
more customers are more likely to gain new customers in the future. Such banks can more 
easily increase capital. 
 
Data 
 
We obtain data for U.S. banks from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Our 
sample contains ROA, Risk, Probability, Provisions, and Size data from 1996 to 2012 for 
almost all the banks in the US.  
 
Our sample contains 1,309 banks. Berger and Bouwman (2013) divide banks into three 
subsamples according to total assets with the cut-point 1 billion and 3 billion. Following that 
paper, we divide the sample into three subsamples. The first subsample consists of small 
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banks, with each having total assets of less than 1 billion. The second subsample comprises 
the medium banks, with each having total assets from 1 billion to 3 billion. The third 
subsample consists of the large banks, with each having total assets exceeding 3 billion. We 
use the year-end financial data reported in the Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank 
Holding Companies. 
 
To account for the impact of the recent financial crisis that began in 2007, we divide the 
whole sample period into two sub-periods. The first is from 1996 to 2006, and the second is 
from 2007 to 2012. 
 
To analyze the relationship between bank capital and the bank financial indicators, we choose 
several variables：Bank capital, Risk, Profitability, Bank deposits, Provision and Size. All of 
the variables will be explained in the following. 
 
Variables 
Dependent variable 
 
Bank capital 
 
We define capital ratio (CAP) as (equity / total assets). Our objective in this paper is 
to identify variables that influence capital ratio. 
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Explanatory variables  
 
Risk 
 
Researchers have measured bank risk using several variables, such as the standard 
deviation of stock returns, Z-score, distance to default and nonperforming loan ratio. 
Following Kleff and Weber (2008), we define RISK as (total risk-weighted assets / 
total assets). Measuring bank risk in this way does not require stock price information. 
 
Profitability 
According to our hypothesis, profitability affects bank capital. We use return on asset 
(ROA) to measure profitability. ROA is defined as (net income / total assets). 
 
Bank deposits  
 
We define bank deposit ratio (BDR) as (deposits / total assets). An important channel 
for banks to raise funds is to use bank deposits, because the interest rates on deposits 
are usually lower than those on borrowed funds. Deposits are crucial for banks to 
increase competitiveness and profit. We expect that banks with higher BDR to have 
higher capital ratio. 
 
Provision 
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The loan loss provision also affects a bank’s capital ratio. We define PROV as (loan 
loss provision / total assets). A larger loan loss provision indicates a bad financial 
situation, and bank may have difficulty to ask loans back. Loan loss provision can 
also influence banks’ ability to generate profit, but this effect has been controlled as 
ROA is included in our regression equation. 
 
Size 
 
Large banks are usually better diversified, and have lower capital ratios. To control for 
bank size, we define SIZE as the natural log of total assets. 
 
Our empirical equation is as follows: 
 
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , ,
, ,
2
2
,
~ (0, )
~ (0, )
j t j t j t j t j t j t j t t j t
j t j j t
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β β β β β β β θ µ
µ µ ε
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= +
 
Year dummies (θt) are included in the equation to control for the factors that influence 
all the banks in a given year. For example, a change of bank regulation in a given year 
affects all the banks in that year. 
,j t
µ  is the bank fixed effect. It controls factors of a 
bank do not change over time, such as the registration state. 
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Change of variables over time 
 
Figure 1-4 show how the mean of each variable changes over time. 
 
The mean of CAP fluctuated from 1996 to 2007, and then decreased quickly to the 
lowest point at 0.0840. After the year 2009, CAP rose dramatically and peaked at 
0.098 in 2012. One possible reason for the increase of CAP after 2009 is that, after the 
recent financial crisis, regulators pressured banks to increase their capital. Another 
possible reason is that banks have learned a lesson from the recent financial crisis and 
decided to voluntarily hold more capital. 
 
The mean of RISK had an upward trend from 1996 to 2009, reaching the maximum 
point. Then, it went down slightly. 
 
The mean of ROA remained almost constant before 2005. Under the influence of the 
financial crisis, it declined sharply to the valley at -0.0036 in 2009. It gradually 
increased to 0.007 in 2012. 
 
The year 2008 was the turning point for BDR. Before 2008, the mean of BDR had a 
declining trend. After 2008, it had an increasing trend. 
 
The mean of PROV was around 0.002 before 2006. When the recent financial crisis 
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began in 2007, the mean of PROV went up substantially, reaching 0.0140 in 2009.  
 
Taken together, these graphs demonstrate that the variables used in our sample had 
significant change during the crisis period. Therefore, we divide our sample into two 
sub-periods: 1996-2006, and 2007-2012. 
Summary statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics. Each variable has 25,090 observations. This 
large number of observations ensures the reliability of our regression results. RISK 
has higher standard deviation, compared with CAP, ROA, PROV and BDR. 
 
Table 4 reports the correlation matrix. We find that the correlation between any two 
explanatory variables is not very high. This means that multicollinearity is not a 
concern in the regressions. 
 
The correlation between an explanatory variable and the dependent variable (capital 
ratio) has not controlled for the impact of other explanatory variables. Therefore, to 
understand the effect of an explanatory variable on capital ratio, we estimate the 
empirical equation. 
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Considering the panel structure  
 
In the empirical equation, we have included the lagged dependent variable ( , 1j tCAP − ) 
as an explanatory variable. This variable is correlated with the error term. Thus, the 
usual estimation method such as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) cannot be used. 
Therefore, we use the GMM technique. This technique is very popular in the dynamic 
panel analysis. In addition, we treat all the explanatory variables to be endogenous. 
The application of GMM exactly caters to our needs. 
 
Results 
 
GMM regression results are reported in table 5 through 7. 
 
Lagged CAP 
 
We find a remarkably positive relationship between CAP and 1tCAP− , which is 
consistent with hypothesis 1. For the whole sample, the coefficient on 1tCAP−  is 
0.8897. For small, medium, and large banks, the coefficients on 1tCAP−  are 0.8859, 
0.8681 and 0.9032, respectively. For all these coefficients, the p values are 0, which 
means the results are highly significant.  
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These results suggest that a bank’s capital ratio in the previous year affects its capital 
ratio in the current year. The amount of capital is the results of the accumulation year 
after year, and can not change in a short time period. Consequently, previous year 
capital directly determines current year capital. 
 
Does financial crisis affect this result? The answer is no. It is shown that coefficient 
after the crisis almost stays the same, just 0.02 lower than that before crisis. We 
conclude that 1tCAP−  is a crucial factor determining CAP. 
 
Risk 
 
The coefficients on risk are different across the three size groups. For the whole 
sample, the coefficient is -0.0038 (p value is 0). For the small and large banks groups, 
the coefficients are -0.0054 (p value is 0) and -0.0020 (p value is 0.9766). For 
medium banks, the coefficient is 0.000012 (p value is 0.3616). 
 
Thinking of the statistics in detail, the p values of large bank and medium bank are so 
large, suggesting that these two coefficients are not statistically significant. Therefore, 
for such banks, there is no reliable relationship between risk and capital. 
 
The p value of the coefficient on risk in the small bank group is very small, 
suggesting that there is a negative relationship between risk and capital for small 
 15 
 
banks. A possible explanation is as follows. Small bank tend to be vulnerable to risk. 
The decline of risk helps to raise capital. On the other hand, when risk increases, a 
small bank may find it difficult to raise capital. 
 
Before 2006, the coefficient on risk for the whole sample is -0.0029. After 2006, it 
becomes -0.0063. Obviously, the financial crisis raises the impact of risk on bank 
capital. The catalyst of financial crisis is ignorance of potential risks, and it alarms 
banks to emphasize more heavily on the risk. As a consequence, risks become more 
important in determining bank capital. 
 
Profitability 
 
ROA is a measure of bank profitability, and it shows a clear positive impact on CAP. 
For the whole sample, the coefficient on ROA is 0.5211. The coefficients on ROA for 
the small, medium, and large banks are 0.5501, 0.4919 and 0.4518, respectively. All 
the p values indicate the statistical significance of the results. These results are 
consistent with hypothesis 2. 
 
Small banks have the highest coefficient, while large banks have the lowest. Profit 
increase bank capital. Small banks have relatively smaller profit than large banks, and 
so a rise in profit increases their capital more greatly. In all the regressions, the 
coefficient on ROA is the second largest, which is just behind that of lagged CAP. So 
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the impact of ROA on CAP can not be ignored. 
 
After the financial crisis, coefficient of ROA rises from 0.5322 to the post-crisis level 
at 0.6230. Therefore, the positive relationship between ROA and CAP shows an 
upward trend due to financial crisis. Profitability is still a strong support for sufficient 
bank capital. 
 
Bank deposits 
 
The portion of bank deposits in total assets is also relevant to bank capital. 
Coefficients of small and medium banks are both negative, -0.0084 and -0.0037. That 
is to say, the lower the percentage of deposits over total assets, the higher the increase 
of small and medium bank capital is. In contrast, BDR has a not significant positive 
effect on CAP for large banks, with the coefficient of 0.0012 and p value 0.5989. Our 
test rejects the hypothesis 3. 
 
In theory, a bank can fund its assets with deposits, borrowed funds, and equity capital. 
Because small and medium banks do not have easy access to financial markets, they 
fund their assets mainly with deposits and equity capital. Thus, a lower deposit ratio 
implies a higher capital ratio. In contrast, large banks often have significant amount of 
borrowed funds. Thus, deposit ratio has no significant impact on a large bank's capital 
ratio. 
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After the financial crisis, the coefficient changes from -0.04 to -0.115, which means 
that bank deposit’s impact on CAP increases. Deposit is one of the attractive ways to 
fund banks. Making best use this relatively cheap resource can promote banks’ 
competitiveness.  
 
Provision 
We find a positive relationship between provision and capital. The coefficients on 
PROV are 0.1285 for small banks, 0.0533 for medium banks, and 0.2201 for large 
banks. The p-value for medium banks is a little higher.  
 
Large banks have the largest coefficient. Large banks have the ability to absorb more 
bad loans, and in turn, put aside larger portion of loan loss provision in case of 
borrowers fail to pay back the full amount. In this situation, the loan loss provision 
suggests that large banks keep more capital to prepare for the expected loss. 
 
Also, the effect of loan loss provision on capital becomes stronger during and after the 
financial crisis, with coefficient rising from 0.0763 to 0.1061. 
 
Size 
 
The coefficients on SIZE are 0.000025 for small banks (p value 0.8705), 0.0016 for 
medium banks (p value 0.0096), and 0.0002 for large banks ( p value 0.5799). Except 
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for medium banks, the p values of the other two groups suggest the effect is not 
statistically significant. Consequently, we cannot draw a definite conclusion with 
regard to the relationship between size and capital. But for medium banks, the 
relationship is positive and statistically significant. 
 
In terms of subsamples, the year 1996-2006 and 2007-2012, the p value of the year 
2007-2012 is less significant.   
 
Conclusions 
 
We find evidence that 1tCAP−  and ROA have significantly positive effect on capital 
ratio. 1tCAP−  has a stronger influence with coefficient greater than 0.8 in each group. 
For ROA, the coefficients are also significant. So the lagged capital and profitability 
play important roles in driving bank capital. 
 
We have several other findings. First of all, risk of small banks is negatively related 
with capital. Secondly, deposit ratio of small and medium banks also have negative 
effect on capital. Thirdly, there is a positive relationship with small and large banks’ 
loan loss provision and capital. Fourthly, size is positively related with capital ratio at 
medium banks. Finally, regarding the effect of financial crisis, except for SIZE, all the 
variables’ impact of capital is strengthened.  
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To conclude, we have found several important determinants of bank capital. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1  Mean of CAP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2  Mean of RISK 
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Figure 3  Mean of ROA 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4  Mean of BDR 
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Figure 5  Mean of PROV 
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Table 1 
 
Definition of Variables 
 
Dependent Variable Definition 
  
CAP equity/ total assets 
 
 
Explanatory Variables Definition 
  
Lagged CAP CAP of the previous year 
  
RISK Total risk-weighted assets / total assets 
  
ROA Net income / total assets 
  
BDR Deposits / total assets 
  
PROV Loan loss provision / total assets 
  
SIZE Log(total assets) 
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Table 2 
 
Number of banks in our sample by year 
 
Year Number of banks 
1996 1309 
1997 1418 
1998 1525 
1999 1638 
2000 1725 
2001 1850 
2002 1984 
2003 2132 
2004 2258 
2005 2270 
2006 986 
2007 966 
2008 973 
2009 1015 
2010 1009 
2011 1017 
2012 1015 
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Table 3 
 
Summary Statistics 
 
 Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Dependent variable     
CAP 25,090 0.0904 0.0871 0.0289 
     
Explanatory 
variables 
    
RISK 25,090 0.6992 0.7047 0.1171 
ROA 25,090 0.0087 0.0097 0.0085 
BDR 25,090 0.7966 0.8209 0.1023 
PROV 25,075 0.0037 0.0019 0.0058 
SIZE 25,090 13.3832 13.1016 1.3114 
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Table 4 
Table 4.1 Correlation Matrix of whole sample 
 
  
CAP 
 
RISK 
 
ROA 
 
BDR 
 
PROV 
 
SIZE 
 
CAP 
 
1 
     
 
RISK -0.1620 
 
1 
    
 
ROA 0.3383 -0.0714 
 
1 
   
 
BDR -0.1329 0.0400 -0.0134 
 
1 
  
 
PROV -0.1423 0.2049 -0.6401 0.0031 
 
1 
 
 
SIZE -0.0196 0.1333 -0.0954 -0.5149 0.1567 
 
1 
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Table 4.2 Correlation Matrix of small banks 
 
 
  
CAP 
 
RISK 
 
ROA 
 
BDR 
 
PROV 
 
SIZE 
 
CAP 
 
1 
     
 
RISK -0.2179 
 
1 
    
 
ROA 0.3793 -0.0836 
 
1 
   
 
BDR -0.2021 0.0272 -0.0065 
 
1 
  
 
PROV -0.1736 0.2067 -0.6071 0.0357 
 
1 
 
 
SIZE -0.0991 0.1584 -0.1793 -0.1849 0.1686 
 
1 
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Table 4.3 Correlation Matrix of medium banks 
 
 
  
CAP 
 
RISK 
 
ROA 
 
BDR 
 
PROV 
 
SIZE 
 
CAP 
 
1 
     
 
RISK -0.0792 
 
1 
    
 
ROA 0.3269 -0.0767 
 
1 
   
 
BDR -0.1714 0.1688 -0.1319 
 
1 
  
 
PROV -0.1456 0.1613 -0.7178 0.0890 
 
1 
 
 
SIZE 0.0038 0.0247 -0.0138 -0.0598 0.0672 
 
1 
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Table 4.4 Correlation Matrix of large banks 
 
 
  
CAP 
 
RISK 
 
ROA 
 
BDR 
 
PROV 
 
SIZE 
 
CAP 
 
1 
     
 
RISK 0.0702 
 
1 
    
 
ROA 0.1461 0.0471 
 
1 
   
 
BDR 0.0798 0.1859 -0.0264 
 
1 
  
 
PROV 0.0024 0.1972 -0.6398 0.0792 
 
1 
 
 
SIZE -0.0224 0.1972 0.0152 -0.5808 0.0510 
 
1 
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Table 5 
 
Regression Results: whole sample 
 
 β P value 
Intercept 0.0072 0.3248 
 
0.8897 0.0000 
RISK -0.0038 0.0000 
ROA 0.5211 0.0000 
BDR -0.0040 0.0000 
PROV 0.1284 0.0000 
SIZE 0.0003 0.0002 
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Table 6 
 
Regression results: subsample by size 
 
 
 Small Banks 
(<1 Billion) 
Medium Banks 
(1-3 Billion) 
Large Banks 
(>3 Billion) 
 β P Value β P Value β P Value 
Intercept 0.0150 0.3242 -0.0130 0.0674 0.0033 0.7676 
 
0.8859 0.0000 0.8681 0.0000 0.9032 0.0000 
RISK -0.0054 0.0000 0.000012 0.9766 -0.0020 0.3616 
ROA 0.5501 0.0000 0.4919 0.0000 0.4518 0.0000 
BDR -0.0084 0.0000 -0.0037 0.0894 0.0012 0.5989 
PROV 0.1285 0.0000 0.0533 0.1880 0.2201 0.0000 
SIZE 0.000025 0.8705 0.0016 0.0096 0.0002 0.5799 
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Table 7 
 
Regression results: subsample by period 
 
 
 1996-2006 2007-2012 
 β P Value β P Value 
Drift 0.0132 0.1549 0.0214 0.7532 
 
0.8890 0.0000 0.8678 0.0000 
RISK -0.0029 0.0001 -0.0063 0.0000 
ROA 0.5322 0.0000 0.6230 0.0000 
BDR -0.0040 0.0000 -0.0115 0.0000 
PROV 0.0763 0.0035 0.1061 0.0002 
SIZE -0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0.5098 
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